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THE NEXT CENTURY will definitely be a century of the audio-visual, an alpha-numeric century. This
will have an enormous impact on culture. In every household, of whatever might then be called the developed
world, there will be a huge TV screen and a smaller one in each room. Add the internet and other advances
technology will offer and you will easily agree that, whether we like it or not, the audio-visual media will
play the role of the most important, dominant vectors of art and culture. Furthermore, the attitude towards
these developments of still too many intellectuals and artists -- one of hostility and snubbing the audio-visual
instead of trying to influence it and occupy an increasingly important position in its structures and programs
-- seems a suicidal one. These are the reasons why the Europeans fight for a ”cultural exception” to the
GATT agreements on free trade concerning the audio-visual domain acquires an enormous importance, at
least for the foreseeable future.
We should understand that the United States and Europe (as well as Canada, in a different way) are from the
outset placed in different starting blocs. Not only economically, but in the first place due to their traditions
and the basic character of their cultures.
Since the very beginning of their history, the European cultures in general and the arts in particular were
aimed at a certain elite and were generated from this elite. It took decades, even centuries, before these cre-
ations reached larger (but still fairly restricted) audiences, crossing the social boundaries only with difficulty
and stubbornly preserving their particular, local, and in many cases national character.
The American culture and arts have had a very different history. Since their origins they were aimed at
a popular audience, composed of immigrants from all parts of the world. They took them into their band
wagons in the pursuit of their ”manifest destiny,” that is crossing the continent, in conditions radically
different from those in which European culture and arts were created and consumed. And more importantly,
most of these immigrants wanted to become Americans, as quickly as possible, and adopted, with a lesser or
greater success, a common vernacular, a shared language -- it is only in the second half of this century that
some more significant linguistic barriers began to reappear again. Finally, it should not be forgotten that
even the privileged classes of the American society -- like the southern aristocracy or the urban upper middle
class -- were in their habits, their taste and their general culture much closer to the immigrant masses than
to the corresponding social strata within the European nations.
It is on these premises that the United States developed through three centuries a tradition of a mass culture
unique in the world, aimed at everybody, understandable to all, with a very small common denominator,
and brought it close to the non-American masses throughout the world. This tradition is the very source
of the indisputable quality of the American mass culture which succeeded in integrating its many different
confluents into a mainstream of unequalled authenticity. And it is exactly this authenticity of the American
mass culture -- highly appreciated around the world by different audiences, including the most sophisticated
ones -- that cannot be imitated (I firmly believe that a film such as Schindler’s List could only be made in
America, by an American director).
Exactly this is also the secret of the miracle of Hollywood and, to an ever larger extent, of the American
television. Film and television were never conceived there as culture in the narrow sense of the word, but
almost exclusively as popular entertainment, aimed at everybody and reflecting the dreams and the truth of
all, without inferiority complexes and with a great craftsmanship and savoir-faire.
On the other side of Atlantic, and with only a few exceptions, the European mass culture -- or better ”mass
cultures” -- will never be aimed at everybody, will never be able to become the truth and the dream of all.
Their common denominator is too high and all the attempts to diminish it have been wooed to failure, being
most ridiculous for their lack of authenticity. Even French so-called mass culture will always appeal just to
the French, the German one to the Germans, etc.
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This is the reason -- and the more in the field of the audio-visual productions aimed primarily at Mister
Everybody -- why the European mass products do not stand any chance against similar US productions
within an unlimited free market competition in Europe, and even less in America. Let us take just one
example, of the British film master named Charlie Chaplin. As long as his genius enriched the American
mass culture, he was a great success. However, as soon as he attempted -- beginning with his Modern Times
(1936) -- to raise the common denominator of his films, his universal popularity was over. It is this reason,
in the first place, and not because of politics, that the American audiences turned their backs on him. All
that of course does not apply only to the domain of the audio-visual: Did you ever ask yourselves why the
American best-selling popular literature has been as popular in Europe at it is in America, but not at all
the other way round?
It is on these grounds why a cultural exception to the GATT agreements is absolutely vital for the survival
of authentic European cultures, mainly in the realm of the audio-visual. It will be necessary to persuade
the Americans that this is not a French or a European ploy based upon some primitive anti-Americanism.
This argument is so obviously one of the bad faith that it does not deserve to be discussed. The fact is
that there is a real problem of cultural identity. Some people in Europe sincerely believe that you could
promote authentically European audio-visual productions, able to conquer to American market. There are
even those, on both sides of the Atlantic, who believe that to do so it would be sufficient to shoot in English
-- or at least to dub into English. A certain André‚ Mulligan from Washington D.C. summed up this way of
thinking some time ago in the French weekly L’Express: ”... Instead of attacking the American imports --
he wrote -- the Europeans should turn the tide and start exporting their productions into the whole world...
What Filipacchi (the French press mogul) did with the journal ELLE is an excellent example. Another
one is provided by the success of the British Journal The Economist in America.” Any comment on this
fallacy seems superfluous. But we can extrapolate from it how different the American concept of culture is,
compared to the European one.
In fact, European audio-visual productions originating in their own cultures do not stand any chance to
conquer more than a marginal share of the American market. That is, the few specialized theatres in a few
big American cities, and a few TV programs, aired mostly at night and by cable. Their audiences will always
remain limited to those few interested in foreign cultures. No comparison to the multi-million crowds which
in Europe and elsewhere are the consumers of the American mass culture. No comparison, too, in terms
of distributors’ interest and of revenues. Clearly, European audio-visual cultures cannot live off the world
market, and must therefore be subsidized.
But why is it that Europeans could not produce films and TV programs appealing to audiences attached
to the American productions? Such a situation would presuppose artificial, unnatural, glued-together multi-
national productions turning out shows with a very low common denominator, without any specific national
or regional identity. In most of the cases the result would be just a pale copy of the products of the American
mass culture, without their inherent authenticity,(1) their truthfulness. Those craving after such productions
are just calling for the abandonment of all cultural identity as it has been understood in Europe for centuries.
Heinrich von Kleist observed in his essay ”On Marionette Theatre:” ”...To the extent to which conscious
reflection becomes dimmer and weaker, grace becomes more resplendent and dominant... When knowledge
has, in a manner of speaking, passed through an infinity does grace reappear; so that at the same time it
appears in its purest form in that human bodily structure which has either no consciousness at all, or an
infinite consciousness, i.e. in the mechanical figure, or in the godhead.”
If we one day comprehend that the American culture and civilization are not just an extension of the
European ones beyond the ocean but a very different culture and civilization, the mutual understanding will
improve and the mutual reproaches -- e.g. ”why are you not like me, why can’t you understand, it is so
simple?” -- will cease. Not only in the realm of culture.
But let us get back to Europe. The European cultural tradition is -- as already mentioned -- of a rather
particular kind. It was always generated by cultural elites, aimed at them, and transmitted to larger shifts
of the population only progressively and after some time has elapsed. This originally elitist cultural heritage
constitutes nevertheless the backbone of the European cultural tradition, even in such domains as religion,
folklore, music, eating habits, manners -- and more generally daily life.
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Through centuries this elitist culture was unable to live off the market; it had to be subsidized -- and it
was subsidized. The linguistic or ethnic markets for culture were small, the consumers few, the means of
cultural communication limited. The sponsors of culture and cultural activities had thus been, since times
immemorial, the rulers, the cities, the church, and eventually the nation-states. All of those must be regarded
as public institutions and their actions as public funding. Thus the public funding is one of Europe’s cultural
traditions. Exceptions appeared in most cases rather late, primarily in Protestant countries. But even there
it became progressively evident that the multifaceted, multilingual character of European cultures requires
not only private but also public help if they have to prosper, or even survive.
This tradition has been recently contested and it becomes more and more urgent to analyze its different
aspects on the eve of the twenty-first century.
In fact, is there a European culture? And if so, what is it?
As in any culture, culture in Europe is rooted in history and historical experience. In a certain way, this
history and these experiences are often shared by all European nations. While the American history is
basically a success story, the European one is a succession of tragedies.(2) This experience constitutes the
common denominator of European cultures, each of them, at the same time, being rooted deeply in a history
of its own.
How should a cultural policy be formulated or conceived, when there is no common language at the common
denominator uniting those different cultures is rather high?
First, we must attempt to describe the particularity of European culture, that is, its distinction form the
American, African, and Asian ones. The ”europeanity” of the different European cultures will thus become
evident. It will also become apparent that one of its particularities is their diversity confronted with the
paradigm previously stated. Which means that, in the first place, the shared paradigm as well as the diversity
must be kept in mind at the outset of any approach towards a policy for culture.
Its aim then should first be the common understanding of what is shared, and, second, the understanding
and acceptance of the differences as a source of riches for everybody. Mutual knowledge and understanding
could then start playing a political and social role in solving or at least living through the different problems
and dangers of the coming century.
Finally, it should be understood that there can be a European framework, cultural institutions, funding,
projects etc; but that there cannot be ”a European product”, a single ”European” culture and the less art
-- but only different creations, generated by the different cultures, with their own distinctions against the
common and shared paradigm.
At this point, let me open a parenthesis. The subject which has to be considered is the one of so called high
culture -- in opposition to mass culture. This culture and its products rarely reach -- at the moment of their
creation -- more than one percent of the population. How many Germans read Goethe in their lifetime? Or
Hawthorne, Melville, Thoreau, and Poe in America? One per cent? I doubt it. And how many Europeans
listen to Mozart today, by their own choice? Two hundred years after Mozart, are they two or three per
cent? There are many more similar examples.
What do I wish to say? That the number of those who are interested in the products of ”high” culture is
clearly disproportional in relation to its overall impact (and this includes of course philosophy, sociology,
history and other disciplines in human sciences, and in another way natural sciences too). All this acquires
a particular importance in our age, in the age of the audio-visual, however not only in relation to it. The
public who listened to Mozart and read Goethe in their time is no more. Those who would read the Goethe
of today do not have the means to sponsor him, and those who have the means do not listen to the Mozarts
and the Beethovens of today. Precisely this fact acquires an enormous importance in the domain of the
audio-visual. The main argument against for example the French-German cultural channel ARTE is that
its audience does not exceed two per cent in France (where it is accessible publicly) and one per cent in
Germany (where it is cabled). But nobody argues that this is likely more and sometimes much more than
the percentage of audience reached by our cultural heritage since its creation thousands of years ago. Should,
in the age of the audio-visual, the Europeans apply mass-audience criteria on their cultural output, we can
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rest assured that there would never be an audio-visual Rimbaud, nor Joyce, Proust, Kandinsky, and Bartók.
For, among others, the very simple reason that the small, restricted, linguistically limited European audiovi-
sual markets do not compare with the American ones. On the other hand, the production costs of audiovisual
art and other elements of high culture mostly do. (dominated by the American mass culture). The problem
of publicly subsidized audiovisual culture and its distribution is thus of greatest importance for the very
survival of the European national cultures in the age of the audiovisual.
This is why Europe needs the ”cultural exception.”
Notes
1.An authentic creator -- whether of ”mass” or ”high” culture is irrelevant -- is the one who can only imagine
himself as his audience.
2. It is not by accident that so much of the American ”high” culture and art has been created by dominated
or otherwise excluded groups, such as Southerners or Jews.
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